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In the present empirical analysis we try to assess the impact of taxation on in-
vestment growth. In particular, and by using gross fixed capital formation as a proxy
for investment, we intend to evaluate the impact of the taxation structure in invest-
ment dynamics, in a short and a long-run perspectives. This empirical exercise was
conducted for all OECD countries, during the 1980-2015 period. Through panel data
econometric techniques, we find optimal tax-investment threshold values, specially
higher for short-term than for long-term evolution. Also, we find optimal income
taxation rounding 9%, in percentage of GDP, an average optimal value 12.7% for
consumption taxes to promote annual investment growth.
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It is trivial among academics that investment is crucial to promote long-run economic
growth. Those decisions enable to sustain consumption in the long-run by applying the
economic productive factors in both old and new economic production processes. Therefore,
taxation can jeopardize the investment decisions. In particular, the raise of revenues of
both income and consumption of individual and the taxation on firms can, on one hand,
reduce the level of aggregate consumption, and, on another hand, decrease the investment
profitability rates, through the reduction of aggregate demand that those investments are
expecting to face.
However, when the investment levels are beyond those, which promote the optimal con-
sumption balanced path, it is imperative to promote the reduction of investment decisions.
This happens when the condition of economic dynamic efficiency is not verified, i.e., when
the return rate on capital exceeds the economic growth rate. More specifically, it is veri-
fied a non-optimal level of investment when the marginal product of capital is lesser than
the economic growth rate, as illustrated in several economic exogenous growth theories as,
for e.g., in Solow (1956)-Swan (1956) and Ramsey (1928)-Cass (1965)-Koopmans (1963).
In contrast to this perspective, when investment levels are below the optimal levels that
guarantee a sustainable growth path, there are some viewpoints that claim for government
intervention, through the public spending and investment increasing. There are empir-
ical evidences that sustain the possibility of the raise of public investment leading to a
crowding-in effect in private investment and, therefore, increases in the aggregate invest-
ment levels (Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009), for e.g.). Therefore, it is essential to analyse
the taxation effects on investment dynamics, namely, what tax items can jeopardize gross
capital formation decisions and those that can promote it, in a short and long run per-
spectives. Yet, in this study, it is our intention to compute possible non-linear relations
between tax items and gross fixed capital formation. In addition, we always consider the
overall government expenditures and that the revenues collected by taxes are reintroduced
in the economic circuit.
This study is organised in the following sections: section 2 provides a brief review
on the existing literature regarding the causalities of taxation on investment; section 2.1
highlights the applied methodology, and the databases used in this analysis; section 3
details the obtained results, and, lastly, section 4 summarizes our conclusions.
2 Literature Review
Some papers address the impact of tax policies on investment behaviour, namely the
corporate income tax and its effects on investment decision-making process. We can high-
light, for instance, the study conducted by Da Rin et al. (2010) which makes use of panel
data techniques to assess the impact of taxation on firms for a set of more than 2.5 million
firms in 17 European countries, and for the period between 1997 and 2004. The authors
conclude that a corporate tax reduction is related with a decreasing capital-labour ratio,
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more specifically, the impact of corporate taxes is stronger on capital than labour firm’s
proportion. Yet, as the authors highlight, a tax reduction is desired to promote the entrance
of firms on the market; however, this policy can also favour the entrance of less financial
robust firms. The same conclusion regarding the effect of corporate taxation and the mar-
ket entry is reached in Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2014). In fact, the authors verified that
a 10% reduction in corporate taxation increases the market entry in 3%. Complementing
the previous conclusions, Rin et al. (2011) concludes for a non-linear relationship between
tax and firms entrance on the market.
For 14 developed countries in the 1982-2007 period, Bond and Xing (2015) find a
negative relationship between taxes on firms and its effects on firm’s capital–output ratios.
The authors develop an econometric specification for both short-run, through the available
data, and long-run, derived from a constant elasticity of substitution neoclassical model of
investment, and find negative impacts of a 1% increase in firm’s taxation on capital-output
ratios between -0.3% and -0.7%. These results are also corroborated by Djankov et al.
(2010) for a sample of 85 countries in 2004. Moreover, it is also find that manufacturing
activities are more exposed to detrimental effects of corporate taxation. Another study
that corroborates the previous conclusions is the Mukherjee et al. (2017). Besides the fact
of finding a negative impact of taxes on corporate income and R&D activities, the authors
also conclude that the consequence of higher taxes is a lesser supply of new goods and
services into the market economy. On the other hand, Galindo and Pombo (2011) find that
corporate taxes affect more big firms than small and medium size firms in what respects to
investment decisions and productivity. In addition, Brandstetter and Jacob (2013) apply
a difference-in-differences approach to assess the corporate tax on investment dynamics
for the German case, and find heterogeneous responses, i.e., a cut in corporate tax could
lead to investment growth for domestic owned firms in a higher extent when compared
with foreign-owned corporations. Yet, Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) found that,
contrarily to high-income individuals, tax progressivity stimulates the entrepreneur’s entry
for the low-to-average income individuals.
In what respects to productivity, for a set of 11 European countries between 1996
and 2005, Gemmell et al. (2016) conclude that while higher statutory corporate tax rates
impact negatively in productivity levels of small firms, while productivity of bigger firms
is only affected by effective marginal tax rates. Additionally, Langenmayr et al. (2015)
shows the existence of optimal corporation tax structure depending on the competition
degree. In fact, the authors conclude that when the market competition degree is low,
higher taxes favour high productivity firms; when the competition degree tends to the
competitive market conditions and firms’ profit taxes are low, the low-productivity firms
tend to be favoured.
By analysing the effects of consumption taxes on corporate investment decisions, Jacob
et al. (2017) conclude that this source of taxation is also detrimental for firm’s investment
purposes. The results reached by the authors led to the conclusion that the detrimental
effect of consumption taxation is stronger for firms with a higher demand elasticity de-
gree, besides of having a higher exposure to the domestic final consumer’s degree and to
financial restrictions. Another topic is the tax burden and its relationship with risk-taking
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decisions for firms’ investment. Regarding this, Ljungqvist et al. (2017) conclude that
the response to a tax change is not symmetric. In fact, the results suggest that a tax
increase is accompanied by a R&D activities’ reduction, among others activities. The au-
thors also conclude that only low financial leverage firms react to tax cuts, in what respect
risk increasing investment decisions. In addition, a study conducted by Ljungqvist and
Smolyansky (2016) about the effect of corporate taxation on employment and income, in
the United States between 1970 and 2010, concluded that while corporate taxes’ reduction
has little impact on economic growth, tax cuts during an economic contraction can raise
both levels of employment and income.
2.1 Methodology and Data
In this study, we consider that the investment growth, through the growth of gross
fixed capital formation, is a function of taxation composition, denoted by T , of the type
∆I = F (T ).
∆Ii,t = αi,t+β0,i,tgyi,t +
∑
β1,i,tτt+βjxi,t+νi+ηt+εi,t, j = 1, 2, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N (1)
where ∆Ii,t is the investment growth rate (annual or 5-years average) - in our case we use
gross fixed capital formation growth rate as a proxy variable to measure investment growth
-, gyi,t−1 is the real per capita GDP growth rate, τt represents each tax item, as a share of
GDP, xi,t is an independent variable belonging to the control variables’ set, νi and ηt are,
respectively, the country and time-specific effects, and εi,t is the error term of the white
noise-type.
Additionally, we introduce a squared term for each tax component to evaluate the
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(3)
Each tax threshold is computed by equalizing equation (3) to zero, as in equation (4):




Therefore, if we obtain a significant negative signal for β2,i,t we have a concave relation-
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ship between a tax item and the investment dynamic, translating into an optimal value
for taxation to maximize investment. On the other hand, a convex relationship through
a positive coefficient for β2,i,t translates into a value that hampers investment growth de-
cisions. Therefore, in the empirical results section when we get convex relations we will
highlight that coefficient to differentiate between maximum and minimum optimal levels.
The model herein computed considers the period between 1980 and 2015, for the overall
OECD countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Chile
(CHL), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France
(FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL),
Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), South Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Luxembourg
(LUX), Mexico (MEX), the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR),
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP),
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR) and United
States (USA).
The final database used in our analysis includes data from several sources: the PPP per
capita GDP (realgdppc), the public debt (debt) and the total government spending (tot-
exp), both in ratio of GDP, and output gap, in percent of potential GDP (outputgap) are
from World Economic Outlook (IMF); taxes on income, profits and capital gains of indi-
viduals (taxinc), taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporates (taxfirms), social
security contributions (ssc), taxes on payroll and workforce (taxpayroll), taxes on property
(taxprop), taxes on goods and services (taxvat), gross fixed capital formation (gfcf ) and
its growth rate (gfcfgr) were retrieved from OECD.Stats database, the age dependency
ratio, as percentage of active population (ageratio), deposit interest rate (depositrate), net
foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio (foreigninvestment), and the GDP percentage of
household final consumption expenditure (hconsggdp) are from the World Development In-
dicators (WDI). Population in millions (pop) and the real total factor productivity (rtfpna)
are from Feenstra et al. (2015) data. Lastly, while liquid liabilities-to-GDP ratio (llgdp) is
based on International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. The table 1 presents the summary
statistics for each variable used in our regressions1.
For the coefficients estimation, we resort to panel data techniques, throughout the
application of OLS, OLS-Fixed Effects (FE), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and
Robust Least Squares (RLS) methodologies. With the exception of RLS, those estimations
assume the white diagonal covariance matrix hypothesis. Additionally, we estimate both
equations (1) and (2) for both annual and 5-years average growth rates. Lastly, we will only
discuss the threshold existence when the coefficients of each tax items present statistical
significance for both linear and square term items tax regressors, for a minimum of 90%
confidence interval.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables set for investment regressions, 1980-2015.
realgdppc taxinc taxfirms ssc taxpayroll taxprop taxvat
Mean 24.448 8.820 2.806 8.345 0.369 1.745 10.588
1For reasons of parsimony, the results of realgdppc are expressed in thousands of USD.
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Std dev 14.313 4.635 1.500 4.981 0.728 1.003 3.046
Max 101.054 26.780 12.594 19.173 5.661 7.334 18.730
Min 2.184 0.873 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.074 2.979
Obs. 1195 1106 1106 1137 1137 1137 1137
gfcf gfcfgr depositrate ageratio debt foreigninvestment rtfpna
Mean 23.161 3.314 9.253 51.287 55.728 3.645 0.941
Std dev 4.091 8.917 25.364 6.931 35.901 10.487 0.123
Max 39.404 45.119 682.53 96.457 242.113 252.308 1.539
Min 11.546 -47.761 -0.180 36.323 3.664 -58.323 0.472
Obs. 1174 1164 1055 1260 943 1120 1173
totexp pop hconsggdp outputgap
Mean 42.621 33.531 56.382 -0.319
Std dev 9.657 52.235 7.069 2.85
Max 68.436 319.449 79.551 14.911
Min 14.244 0.228 29.918 -11.437
Obs. 977 1173 1174 851
3 Results
3.1 Short-run effects of taxation on investment dynamics
The short-run analysis for equation (1), i.e, without the tax items square terms, evi-
dence a negative relation between all type of taxes and investment increasing, as it was
expected, with the exception of payroll taxes, which appears to have a positive correlation
between the revenue levied by this type of taxes and the investment decisions. In detail,
while by an increment of 1% of revenues collected from payroll taxes, in proportion of GDP,
the gross capital formation increases by 2%, the negative impact of a one unit increasing
in revenues by all mentioned taxes vary approximately between 0.09% and 0.66%.
Moreover, we verify a negative impact in the following variables: deposit interest rates
(by about 0.4%), household consumption (0.2%). On contrary, we verify the positive im-
pact of foreign investment, always greater than 0.1%. Looking in detail at the government
debt growth impact, it seems that this variable crowds out aggregate investment. On
the other hand, and while public expenditures growth and age dependency ratio do not
evidence to influence investment decisions, output gap reveals to be favourable to gross
fixed capital formation, between 0.27% and 0.74%. This positive effect can be explained
by the fact that when the economy is overheating, inflation pressures could decrease the
amortization time of the investment, and, consequently, increase its profitability.
In what respects to tax items thresholds for investment decision-making, through the
growth rate of gross fixed capital formation, it is possible to verify the non-existence of
this thresholds for taxes on payroll and taxes on property. Regarding the other tax items,
we reach to a value of 10.65% for taxes on individual income on GDP, which translates
the maximum value that promotes investment, while we assist to minimizing values for
social security contributions of 12.09%, and 7.37% and 14.18%, on average, for tax on
firms and on consumption, respectively. The values reached for the last three tax items
evidence their minimum revenue, in GDP proportion, to promote investment growth. The
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above-mentioned results are presented in table 2.
Table 2: Linear and non-linear short-run impact results of taxation structure on investment
decisions.
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆realgdppc 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc−1 -0.144** -0.069 0.131 1.491** -0.127 0.037 -0.128** -0.182
(0.070) (0.215) (0.199) (0.577) (0.112) (0.367) (0.061) (0.175)
taxinc2−1 -0.007 -0.070** -0.015 -0.001
(0.009) (0.031) (0.017) (0.008)
taxfirms−1 -0.442** -1.580*** 0.277 -0.595 -0.561*** -3.859*** -0.289** -1.032**
(0.176) (0.568) (0.272) (0.779) (0.263) (1.488) (0.140) (0.427)
taxfirms2−1 0.107** 0.070 0.279** 0.066*
(0.044) (0.060) (0.115) (0.039)
ssc−1 -0.121** -0.436** -0.047 -2.007** -0.151 -0.703 -0.086* -0.276
(0.058) (0.209) (0.230) (1.013) (0.095) (0.437) (0.050) (0.180)
ssc2−1 0.017 0.083** 0.028 0.010
(0.011) (0.039) (0.021) (0.010)
taxpayroll−1 -0.324 0.420 1.990** 3.002 -0.065 -2.013 -0.284 0.107
(0.262) (0.929) (0.968) (1.904) (0.381) (1.546) (0.277) (0.934)
taxpayroll2−1 -0.365 -0.304 0.729 -0.144
(0.356) (0.540) (0.682) (0.383)
taxprop−1 -0.571* -0.588 -0.211 0.775 -0.036 3.822 -0.013 1.139
(0.295) (1.025) (0.508) (1.521) (0.649) (2.793) (0.255) (0.770)
taxprop2−1 0.042 -0.118 -0.658 -0.208
(0.166) (0.214) (0.443) (0.141)
taxvat−1 -0.612*** -2.640*** 0.413 0.291 -0.103 -2.691* -0.663*** -1.982***
(0.163) (0.635) (0.363) (1.127) (0.3) (1.519) (0.133) (0.538)
taxvat2−1 0.099*** 0.016 0.111 0.066**
(0.033) (0.057) (0.072) (0.026)
gfcf−1 -0.521*** -0.615*** -1.283*** -1.337*** -0.077 -0.340 -0.505*** -0.599***
(0.104) (0.123) (0.148) (0.159) (0.111) (0.208) (0.072) (0.079)
gfcfgr−1 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.429** 0.267 0.259*** 0.257***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.183) (0.169) (0.032) (0.032)
∆depositrate -0.426* -0.435* -0.436* -0.414* 1.063 -1.323 -0.583*** -0.606***
(0.241) (0.238) (0.256) (0.251) (1.233) (1.526) (0.160) (0.159)
ageratio−1 -0.016 -0.053 -0.065 -0.029 -0.044 -0.029 -0.027 -0.058
(0.067) (0.071) (0.137) (0.144) (0.116) (0.104) (0.053) (0.055)
∆debt -0.275*** -0.303*** -0.189** -0.200** -0.487* -0.543** -0.264*** -0.295***
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.258) (0.218) (0.047) (0.047)
rtfpna -12.705*** -12.809*** -6.562 -2.947 2.829 -0.873 -10.328*** -10.345***
(3.769) (3.884) (5.536) (6.308) (4.246) (5.567) (2.677) (2.770)
∆totexp−1 -0.148 -0.160 -0.088 -0.081 0.315 -0.139 0.053 0.032
(0.159) (0.163) (0.154) (0.157) (0.654) (0.602) (0.104) (0.104)
log(pop) -0.497 -0.580 61.785*** 63.702*** 0.228 -0.501 -0.926*** -0.997***
(0.397) (0.396) (10.841) (11.771) (0.878) (0.974) (0.237) (0.243)
foreigninvestment−1 -0.075*** -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.066*** 0.028 0.009 -0.075*** -0.073***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.087) (0.091) (0.015) (0.015)
hconsumption−1 0.039 0.013 -0.214** -0.242** 0.07 0.000 0.036 0.024
(0.027) (0.028) (0.093) (0.094) (0.048) (0.049) (0.027) (0.028)
outputgap 0.369** 0.466*** 0.690*** 0.736*** -0.849** 0.121 0.271*** 0.352***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.170) (0.395) (0.565) (0.091) (0.093)
Tax thresholds
taxinc - - - 10.65% - - - -
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taxfirms - 7.38% - - - 6.92% - 7.82%
ssc - - - 12.09% - - - -
taxpayroll - - - - - - - -
taxprop - - - - - - - -
taxvat - 13.33% - - - - - 15.02%
R-squared 0.540 0.554 0.680 0.687 0.343 0.477 0.401 0.414
DW-Stat 1.856 1.875 2.000 2.018 2.110 1.949 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 529 529 529 529 473 473 529 529
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
3.2 Long-run effects of taxation on investment dynamics
In a long-run perspective, and in a linear relationship (see regressions (9), (11), (13) and
(15)), the results obtained highlight similar patterns for the verified short-run effects on
tax items and investment growth, with the exception for the tax on property that appears
to be not relevant to determine investment decisions. In addition, we can observe that the
values presented in tables 2 and 3 highlight similar magnitudes for the tax items coefficients
in investment growth.
Regarding the other control variables, and similar to the short-run perspective, popu-
lation size evidences a contradictory signal. Moreover, household consumption and output
gap variables highlight a non-clear effect on investment dynamics, since these last two
variables also present different signals, depending on the econometric technique used.
Yet, it seems that the deposit interest rates had a negative effect on investment in
a long-term perspective. Specifically, by a 1 p.p. increase in deposit interest rates, the
investment tend to decrease between 0.4 p.p. and 0.6 p.p., approximately. Additionally, the
government spending variation also seems to gain importance in the long-term, presenting
a slightly negative impact on capital formation.
In what respects to the analysis of the non-linear relationships of tax items on invest-
ment decision, and by computing the consequent existing tax items-to-investment thresh-
olds, we find maximum values of 6.27% and 9.19% for taxation on firms’ profits and for
consumption taxes, respectively. On the opposite side, we find a minimum threshold value
for social security contributions of 11.35%. In the long run, we can also observe that the
optimal for taxes on payroll disappears. The above-discussed results may be observed in
detail in table 3.
Table 3: Linear and non-linear long-run impact results of taxation structure on investment
decisions.
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
∆realgdppc 0.000** 0.000** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc−1 -0.042 -0.085 0.131 0.740 -0.127 -0.263 -0.128** 0.021
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(0.051) (0.091) (0.199) (0.571) (0.112) (0.169) (0.061) (0.114)
taxinc2−1 0.003 -0.042 0.012* -0.004
(0.004) (0.029) (0.007) (0.005)
taxfirms−1 -0.098 -0.197 0.277 0.489 -0.561** -0.601 -0.289** -0.828***
(0.107) (0.458) (0.272) (0.747) (0.263) (0.734) (0.140) (0.278)
taxfirms2−1 0.014 -0.028 0.041 0.066***
(0.034) (0.053) (0.055) (0.025)
ssc−1 -0.069** -0.227** -0.047 -0.417 -0.151 -0.150 -0.086* -0.255**
(0.034) (0.091) (0.230) (0.662) (0.095) (0.172) (0.050) (0.117)
ssc2−1 0.010* 0.008 0.006 0.009
(0.005) (0.023) (0.010) (0.006)
taxpayroll−1 -0.168 0.170 1.990** 1.156 -0.065 0.221 -0.284 -0.164
(0.160) (0.490) (0.968) (1.352) (0.381) (0.986) (0.277) (0.608)
taxpayroll2−1 -0.215 -0.467 -0.334 -0.044
(0.185) (0.503) (0.415) (0.249)
taxprop−1 -0.258 -0.971 -0.211 -0.816 -0.036 -1.381 -0.013 0.447
(0.181) (0.868) (0.508) (1.838) (0.649) (1.260) (0.255) (0.501)
taxprop2−1 0.137 0.122 0.190 -0.052
(0.124) (0.219) (0.198) (0.092)
taxvat−1 -0.271** -0.183 0.413 1.985*** -0.103 0.298 -0.663*** -0.499
(0.109) (0.397) (0.363) (0.571) (0.300) (0.853) (0.133) (0.350)
taxvat2−1 -0.007 -0.108*** -0.040 0.022
(0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.017)
gfcf−1 -0.114* -0.100 -1.283*** -0.259*** -0.077 0.096 -0.505*** -0.083
(0.062) (0.069) (0.148) (0.091) (0.111) (0.115) (0.072) (0.052)
gfcfgr−1 0.274*** 0.267*** 0.225*** 0.214*** 0.429** 0.265*** 0.259*** 0.292***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.061) (0.036) (0.183) (0.100) (0.032) (0.021)
∆Depositrate -0.648*** -0.644*** -0.436* -0.468*** 1.063 -0.388 -0.583*** -0.573***
(0.124) (0.191) (0.256) (0.131) (1.233) (0.815) (0.160) (0.104)
ageratio−1 -0.064 -0.053 -0.065 -0.052 -0.044 0.089** -0.027 -0.071**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.137) (0.112) (0.116) (0.045) (0.053) (0.036)
∆debt -0.239*** -0.238*** -0.189** -0.150*** -0.487* -0.631*** -0.264*** -0.245***
(0.050) (0.057) (0.082) (0.041) (0.258) (0.124) (0.047) (0.031)
rtfpna -4.849** -4.240* -6.562 0.082 2.829 1.089 -10.328*** -4.070**
(2.074) (2.551) (5.536) (4.644) (4.246) (3.229) (2.677) (1.803)
∆totexp−1 -0.046 -0.050 -0.088 0.002 0.315 0.517 0.053 -0.125*
(0.091) (0.077) (0.154) (0.079) (0.654) (0.327) (0.104) (0.068)
log(pop) -0.436** -0.421 61.785*** 14.650** 0.228 -0.203 -0.926*** -0.415***
(0.189) (0.299) (10.841) (7.225) (0.878) (0.391) (0.237) (0.158)
foreigninvestment−1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.070*** -0.006 0.028 0.044 -0.075*** -0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.009) (0.087) (0.047) (0.015) (0.010)
hconsumption−1 0.056*** 0.053*** -0.214** -0.093 0.070 0.057** 0.036 0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.093) (0.102) (0.048) (0.028) (0.027) (0.018)
outputgap -0.144* -0.138 0.690*** -0.085 -0.849** -0.433 0.271*** -0.214***
(0.083) (0.103) (0.159) (0.091) (0.395) (0.312) (0.091) (0.061)
Tax thresholds
taxinc - - - - - - - -
taxfirms - - - - - - - 6.27%
ssc - 11.35% - - - - - -
taxpayroll - - - - - - - -
taxprop - - - - - - - -
taxvat - - - 9.19% - - - -
R-squared 0.476 0.481 0.717 0.730 0.171 0.180 0.360 0.366
DW-Stat 1.124 1.127 1.034 1.095 1.692 1.665 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 529 529 529 529 473 473 529 529
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we developed an empirical model to assess possible relations between
tax composition, in GDP proportion, and investment growth. To perform this exercise we
used gross fixed capital formation as a proxy variable for investment, and our empirical
analysis resorted to panel data techniques to analyse tax effects in both short and long-
term. In addition, we assessed the existence of non-linear relationships between tax items
and investment growth.
The obtained results evidenced the existence of some tax-to-GDP thresholds. Namely,
there were some optimal values of tax items, in share of GDP, which maximizes the in-
vestment decisions. In particular, and regarding the short-run, we reach a maximizing
threshold, which promotes long-run investment growth of 10.65% for taxes on individual
income. On the other hand, in the end, we conclude for maximum threshold levels for taxes
on firms’ profits and taxes on consumption of goods and services of 6.27% and 9.19%, re-
spectively, to promote investment growth. Moreover, we found a minimum threshold of
11.35% of social security contribution.
In what respects the short-run, we found only one maximum threshold of 10.65% for
taxes on individual income, while it is found a minimum threshold value of 12.09% for social
contributions. In addition, we found minimum threshold values, on average, of 7.37% and
14.18% for profits and consumption of goods and services taxes, respectively.
Lastly, and resorting to the results presented in table 1 which allow the comparison of
the short and long-term results for each tax items from the econometric regressions, we
were also able to conclude that there are some fiscal space to raise some taxes to promote
higher investment growth rates, mainly in a short-run perspective. In particular, with the
exception of payroll taxes and taxes on property on firms, we did not find any optimal
value - it seems that the raise of the other taxes tends to be a favourable political measure
to promote investment growth. Moreover, if we sum all the optimal threshold tax items
values with the historical average recorded for taxes, we conclude that taxation over the
GDP should be around 46.41% and 37.75% in the short-run and long-run, respectively.
The table 4 summarizes our main findings regarding average tax threshold values.
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Table 4: Summary of tax items threshold values for investment decisions.
Short-run Long-run Mean
taxinc 10.65% - 8.82%
taxfirms 7.37% 6.27% 2.81%
ssc 12.09% 11.35% 8.35%
taxpayroll - - 0.37%
taxprop - - 1.75%
taxvat 14.18% 9.19% 10.59%
Notes: The non-bold and bold values, presented in the short-run and long-run columns express maximum and minimum
optimum levels, respectively. The values expressed in italics represent average values.
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